The Final Step to Insider Trading Reform: Answering the  It\u27s Just Not Right!  Objection by Anderson, John P.
Mississippi College School of Law
MC Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles Faculty Publications
2016
The Final Step to Insider Trading Reform:
Answering the "It's Just Not Right!" Objection
John P. Anderson
Mississippi College School of Law, jpanders@mc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals
Part of the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of MC Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact walter@mc.edu.
Recommended Citation
12 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 279 (2016).
2016]
THE FINAL STEP TO INSIDER TRADING REFORM:
ANSWERING THE "IT'S JUST NOT RIGHT!" OBJECTION
John P. Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most often quoted passages in Henry Manne's seminal
book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, occurs where Manne lumps
together arguments against insider trading that turn on considerations of
ethics or fairness as "it's just not right" propositions.' In a footnote, Manne
explains that this expression originated with an anonymous lady law stu-
dent, who, during a classroom discussion of the subject, stamped her foot
and angrily declared, "I don't care; it's just not right."2
For Manne, if repetition of such moral exhortations "were a form of
scientific proof, undoubtedly the case against insider trading would long
ago have been proved."3 Such cynicism concerning ethical justification in
the law can be traced back to the early legal realists,4 but it has been par-
ticularly pronounced among members of the modern law and economics
movement, of which Manne was, of course, a founder. The criticism seems
to be that, by comparison to economic analysis, ethical justification is insuf-
ficiently "rigorous" or "scientific" to determine clear and effective legal
principles.
Indeed, Manne (like many other leaders of the law and economics
school) was of the opinion that most, if not all, first-order ethical proposi-
tions ultimately rest on economic justifications-that what is right can usu-
ally be cashed out in terms of what is efficient. I think this view is mistak-
en. But more important for the topic at hand, I think this view is counter-
. Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. Many thanks to George Ma-
son University School of Law and to the Law and Economics Center for inviting me to present during
their Symposium on the Continuing Influence of Henry G. Manne. Thanks to workshop participants
Bradley Bondi, Michael Borden, Gaston de los Reyes, Jr., Yuliya Guseva, Todd Henderson, Joseph
Hylton, Jason Jones, Jeremy Kidd, George Mocsary, Kish Parella, Kenneth Rosen, Paul Salamanca,
Andrew Schwartz, Bernard Sharfman, Edward Stringham, J.W. Verret, Andrew Verstein, Lua Yuille,
and Todd Zywicki, for their shared insights and helpful comments. Thanks also to organizers Jeffrey
Smith and Amanda Olsavsky Hu for their wonderful hospitality.
I HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 15 (1966).
2 Id. at 15, n. 42.
3 Id. at 15.
4 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD L. REV. 457, 464
(1897) ("I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be
banished from the law altogether.").
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productive to those of us who share the opinion that the current insider trad-
ing enforcement regime is in desperate need of liberalization and reform.
The problem is that, despite the fact that the economic analysis of
Manne, Jonathan Macey,5 Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel,6 Todd Hender-
son,7 and others have been successful in showing that the current insider
trading enforcement regime is highly inefficient, most academics, politi-
cians, regulators, and journalists continue to justify it in ethical terms.8
With the principals to the debate speaking at cross-purposes, the result is a
standoff that favors the status quo and precludes reform. This reality has
led most commentators, even those of an economic bent, to reach the con-
clusion that the current insider trading enforcement regime "is doubtless
here to stay."9 This is a serious problem because, in addition to being inef-
ficient, the current insider trading enforcement regime is unjust, incoherent,
and irrational.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I sets the table by dismissing
the notion that economic analysis of law should enjoy some privileged sta-
tus (as more precise, rigorous, or scientific) over ethical analysis of law.
Rather, it is suggested that economic and ethical reasons are best under-
stood as different tools suited for different roles in legal reform. It is then
argued that, given the current climate, ethical reasoning is the best tool for
overcoming the remaining obstacles to insider trading reform in the United
States. Section II begins the ethical analysis by arguing that even if it were
admitted that insider trading harms society and is morally wrong, the cur-
rent enforcement regime would still be unjust, incoherent, irrational, and in
desperate need of reform. Section III proposes the legalization of issuer-
licensed insider trading as one effective means of reforming the current
regime but anticipates the "it's just not right" objection. Section IV con-
fronts the "it's just not right" objection on its own ethical terms and demon-
strates that, while it is true that some forms of insider trading are not moral-
ly permissible on either consequentialist or deontological grounds, issuer-
5 See generally, Jonathan R. Macey, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
(1991).
6 See generally, Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN L. REV. 857 (1983).
7 See generally, M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505
(2011).
8 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, What's So Bad About Insider Trading Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 751, 775
(2015) ("There are questions about whether [the current insider trading enforcement regime] is the best.
from an economic viewpoint to encourage efficient trading, but that is likely not the only goal in
prohibiting trading that carries a stigma of unfairness and cheating.").
9 STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING: LAW AND POLICY 207 (2014). Even Manne himself
hinted at some resignation in this regard. In email correspondence, he expressed frustration that "Judge
Posner recently said that he didn't see that there was any basis for arguing about [insider trading] since
people just don't like it!"). Email from Henry Manne to John P. Anderson (Sept. 6, 2012, 20:48 UTC)
(on file with author).
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licensed insider trading is morally permissible. Nevertheless, some object
to insider trading, not on consequentialist or deontological moral grounds,
but because it reflects the vice of greed. Section V closes by addressing
this ethical concern. It is argued that criminalizing issuer-licensed insider
trading is not only a poor means of combating the character flaw of greed,
but that criminalization on such grounds would be moralistic (like laws
against sodomy or same-sex marriage) and would therefore conflict with
our society's increasingly shared repugnance toward such laws. Finally, if
our criminalization of issuer-licensed insider trading cannot be justified on
moral or ethical grounds, it must be explained. Some have suggested that
society's envy of those who earn "easy money" offers the explanation.
However, envy is perhaps the worst of all vices, and the Article closes by
cautioning against its seduction.
I. ETHICS AND ECONOMICS: CHOOSING THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB
Richard Posner echoes the view of many proponents of the law and
economics movement when he writes that the "compartmentalization of
knowledge-so conspicuous a feature of the modern world-may have
condemned [ethical theory] to irrelevance at the level of practice.""° For
Posner, the legal problems facing rich liberal countries in the twenty-first
century
present difficult analytical and empirical issues that can no more be understood, let alone re-
solved, by the intuitions and analytic procedures of persons schooled only in the humanities
than problems of high-energy physics or brain surgery can be understood and resolved by the
study of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.I I
Posner is fond of dismissing ethics as a mode of legal justification by
claiming that such appeals may "persuade, but not with rational argu-
10 RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING THE LAW 446 (1995).
11 Id. at 456. Published in 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus is regarded as one of the most
esoteric yet important works of twentieth century philosophy. The book aims to define the limits of
science and metaphysics. It was extremely influential among logical positivists and early philosophers
of language. In his later work, Wittgenstein distanced himself from the "dogmatism" of the Tractatus.
The later Wittgenstein eschewed the Tractatus's attempt at logical precision in favor of a pragmatism
that regards philosophy as nothing more (or less) than a therapeutic tool that is most useful in "language
games" that are divided against themselves, with participants working at cross purposes. In such cases,
philosophy's task is to expose the problem and thereby help to "shew the fly the way out of the fly
bottle." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 309 (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.,
3rd ed. 1967). With this in mind, I suggest that though Wittgenstein would agree with Posner's conclu-
sion that his Tractatus is of little use in the language games played by surgeons and physicists as such,
he would also be sympathetic to the thesis of this Article, which is that there are some dysfunctional
language games, of which our current insider trading enforcement regime is one, within which the tools
of ethical philosophy can be of great practical import by perhaps showing the fly out of the bottle!
2016]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY
ments.'" 2 For Posner, "[a]t its best, moral philosophy, like literature, en-
riches; it neither proves nor edifies."13 Good economic analysis of the law,
by contrast, is purported to offer firm, rational grounds for its conclusions
that are objectively verifiable. It is argued that economic analysis "epito-
mizes the operation in law of the ethic of scientific inquiry, pragmatically
understood," and is therefore far better suited than ethical reasoning to the
challenges of the age.4 In sum, economic analysis, which is science,
should be privileged over ethical analysis, which reduces to nothing more
than "epistemically feeble"'5 exhortation, when analyzing and justifying the
law. But even Posner must admit that things are not that simple.
First, without the aid of ethical justification, micro-economics can
never hope to bridge the "is/ought gap"-it can never hope to transform its
descriptions of market behavior to prescriptions for reform.6 As Posner
himself explains, "nothing in economics prescribes an individual's goals.
But whatever his... goals," rational choice theory provides a tool for chart-
ing the most efficient path to achieving them.'7 The first inquiry, then, is
always what are your goals? Or, as a legal community, what are our goals?
In most cases, this question can only be answered by an appeal to our ethi-
cal values, our conceptions of what is good and what is right. When there
is dispute over these goals, only ethical reasons can resolve them. In this
sense, ethical reasoning is logically prior to economic reasoning as tool for
social reform. In sum, ethics must be relied upon to set our ends, and eco-
nomics are at most instrumental to achieving them.
But I think Posner's real frustration with ethical justification in the law
is that, however that justification is articulated, it offers no rational or ob-
jective grounds. While it may persuade, it does so with grunts and cheers,
not "rational argument." It is the same frustration Manne expresses over
his student's foot-stomping. For Posner, moral claims once espoused by
Enlightenment proponents like Locke, Rousseau and Jefferson as universal
12 RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at ix (1999).
13 Id. at 32.
14 POSNER, supra note 10, at 15.
15 POSNER, supra note 12, at 12.
16 The is/ought gap refers to the fallacy of trying to derive a normative conclusion (an "ought")
from purely descriptive ("is") premises. The philosopher David Hume is credited as the first to give
expression to this problem (sometimes referred to as "Hume's Guillotine" or the "naturalistic fallacy"):
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of
a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to
find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no propo-
sition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but
is, however, of the last consequence. For as the ought or ought not expresses some new rela-
tion or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same
time that a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new re-
lation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.
DAVID HUME, MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 43 (Henry D. Aiken, ed., 1948).
17 POSNER, supra note 10, at 16.
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and rationally demonstrable are today "better understood as just the fancy
dress of workaday social norms that vary from society to society."8 But
this leads to my second point. Even assuming arguendo that Posner is cor-
rect to claim that ethical propositions are not objective, the contingent and
provincial nature of an ethical claim does nothing to diminish its rational
force within the culture or practice that avows it. In other words, moral
relativism need not be vicious or pernicious. For example, the fact that
individual autonomy is not valued as highly in some Asian cultures does
not undermine its crucial importance within our own constitutional culture.
Moreover, once definitions are fixed and inferential relations are set, ethical
analysis can be every bit as precise, rigorous, and testable as can micro-
economic analysis. Of course the devil is often in fixing those definitions
and relations to our audience's satisfaction, but those devils are just as
pesky when setting up microeconomic models. I am reminded of George E.
P. Box's statement that is so often repeated by economists, "all models are
wrong, but some are useful."'9
None of the above is intended to turn the table on Posner and make the
claim that economic analysis must always take a back seat to ethics in justi-
fying existing law or proposing a legal reform. Quite often, indeed most of
the time, the "end" set by ethics is not in dispute but rather, only the most
appropriate means to that end. When this is true, economic analysis will
rightly dominate the debate over needed reform. But insider trading regula-
tion in the United States offers one of those relatively rare situations where,
thanks to the excellent work of Manne and others, the economic stakes of
enforcement are now fairly well-defined, but few seem able to agree on its
ends. There seems to be broad consensus that liberalizing the current re-
gime would improve efficiency. Resistance to such liberalization, however,
comes almost exclusively from those who are concerned that any such lib-
eralization would render markets unjust or unfair and would only spread the
current epidemic of greed on Wall Street.
If your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. The
frustration and resignation of many advocates for insider trading reform
stems from the fact that they persist in making strong economic arguments
to address a problem the public no longer frames in economic terms. They
speak at cross-purposes with their adversaries, and the resulting standoff
favors the status quo. Economics is simply the wrong tool for the job that
remains. The last step to insider trading reform consists of winning the
hearts and minds of those who resist it. This demands advocacy that draws
upon ethical theory and the paradigms of justice, fairness, and the good
which are latent within our public political culture. In what follows, I
sketch out how some of these arguments might look.
18 POSNER, supra note 12, at 6.
19 GEORGE E.P. Box & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE
SURFACES 424 (1987).
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II. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME IS UNJUST AND IRRATIONAL-
REFORM Is NEEDED
I have argued elsewhere that the current insider trading enforcement
regime in the United States is unjust, incoherent, and irrational.20  Under the
current regime, draconian penalties2' are imposed for a crime which has
never been defined by statute or rule.2' The principal statutory authority for
insider trading liability is Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which prohibits the employment of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance [in] connection with the purchase or sale, of any se-
curity. '23 Though Section 10(b) functions as a "catch-all" provision, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that "what it catches must be fraud. '24 But
insiders typically gain their advantage by withholding their material non-
public information while trading over anonymous exchanges. The common
law only regards such silence as fraudulent when there is some duty to dis-
close. The Supreme Court recognizes such a duty under two theories, the
"classical theory" and the "misappropriation theory. 25
Insider trading liability arises under the classical theory when the issu-
er, its employee, or someone otherwise affiliated with the issuer seeks to
benefit from trading (or tipping others who trade) that firm's shares based
on material nonpublic information. In such cases, the insider (or construc-
20 See generally, John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading,
2014, UTAH L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Greed & Envy]; John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea
Change for Insider Trading Enforcement Law: From Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 339 (2015) [hereinafter Anticipating a Sea Change]; John P. Anderson, What's the Harm
in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2015); John P. Anderson, Solving the
Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 273 (2016) [hereinafter Paradox of IT
Compliance]; John P. Anderson, When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading Make
Sense?, STETSON L. REV.. (forthcoming).
21 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189 (1995) ("insider trading ... carries penal-
ties that can only be described as draconian) [hereinafter, State Law Fiduciary Duties]. With the pas-
sage of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), the civil penalty
of treble damages now applies to firms as well as individuals. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, the individual criminal penalty was raised to a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment up to
20 years per violation. Non-natural persons (i.e. firms) are subject to fines of up to $25 million. 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a). As one author points out, under "the federal guidelines, the maximum sentence for
insider trading is nineteen to twenty-four years, while a rapist could get fifteen years to life in prison."
CHARLES GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS 155 (2013).
22 As Stephen Bainbridge puts it, "the modem prohibition [of insider trading] is a creature of SEC
administrative actions and judicial opinions, only loosely tied to the statutory language and its legisla-
tive history." SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (2d ed. 2007).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
24 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
25 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997).
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tive insider) violates a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi-
dence" to her counterparty, the shareholder (or prospective shareholder) on
the other side of the trade.26 Insider trading liability arises under the misap-
propriation theory when one misappropriates material nonpublic infor-
mation and then trades on it without prior notice to the source. The "mis-
appropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's decep-
tion of those who entrusted him with access to the confidential information"
by cheating them out of "the exclusive use of that information."27
A. Insufficient Notice of Crime
The fact that it has never been defined by statute leaves us with the
"jurisprudential scandal that insider trading is largely a federal common law
offense.'2' The Western liberal jurisprudential tradition is suspicious of
common law crimes like insider trading because they often violate the prin-
ciple of legality, which is sometimes expressed in the Latin phrase, nullum
crimen sine lege.29 The principle of legality holds that "there must be no
crime or punishment except in accordance with fixed, reasonably specific,
and fairly ascertainable preestablished law."3 This principle gives expres-
sion to our shared intuition that justice requires that persons be given rea-
sonable notice of when criminal sanctions will be imposed. Otherwise per-
sons would be left helpless to plan their lives to avoid such sanctions. The
same moral intuition informs our repugnance towards ex post facto laws.3'
The history of U.S. insider trading enforcement offers a sad illustration
of the perniciousness of common law crimes. For example, federal regula-
tors imposed sanctions on individuals pursuant to the "equal access" or
"parity-of-information" model of insider trading liability for over two dec-
ades before this model was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court as
inconsistent with its statutory authority in Section 10(b).32 Moreover, de-
26 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
27 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
28 Jeanne Schroeder, Taking Stock: Insider and Outsider Trading by Congress, 5 WM. & MARY
Bus. L. REV. 159, 163 (2014).
29 See e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 195 (1977).
30 Id.
31 Such laws are, of course, unconstitutional pursuant to U.S. Const. art. I §§ 9-10.
32 In 1968, the Second Circuit adopted the SEC's preferred equal access model for insider trading
liability. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (noting section 10(b)
is based "on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on imper-
sonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information"). It took twenty-two years for this
interpretation to reach the Supreme Court, when it was expressly rejected in favor of the fiduciary model
now in place. The Court explained that the formulation of such a broad "parity-of-information rule,"
which "departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship
between to parties ... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
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spite the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United
States left the legal status of the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability uncertain, regulators continued to enforce it for the next seventeen
years before it finally received the Court's imprimatur in United States v.
O'Hagan.33 The SEC and prosecutors continue to press for broader insider
trading enforcement authority, and they would rather ask forgiveness than
permission from the courts. Without a statutory definition, market partici-
pants are just left guessing as to whether that expanded authority will be
recognized by some judge. Most would rather settle than take the risk,
which is precisely the injustice the principle of legality looks to avoid.
It is worth noting that simply codifying the current working definition
of insider trading would not solve the problem. Injustice due to inadequate
notice would persist because the current definition's terms are hopelessly
vague. Both the classical and misappropriation theories impose liability on
those who seek to "benefit from trading . . . on the basis of material non-
public information" in violation of a "fiduciary or other similar relation of
trust and confidence," but few agree on the definition of any one of these
terms.34 In Connally v. General Construction Company, the Supreme Court
held that a law violates due process when a person of "common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning."35  Some scholars have suggested
that the law against insider trading is unconstitutionally vague.36 Indeed it
is hard to disagree with Steven Cohen, founder of SAC Capital Advisors,
LP, and the target of multiple insider trading investigations, when he says
"[i]t's my belief that the rule [against insider trading] is vague, and there-
fore . . . as a lawyer, you can interpret it in lots of different ways."37 As
Professor Homer Kripke put it more generally, "fraud" in Rule lOb-5 has
"come to mean anything that the SEC dislikes because by picking cases in
which it can dramatically describe the facts, the SEC hopes that the facts
will carry the law."38 The latter concern, that regulators may exploit vague-
ness in the law to pursue their own institutional or even personal agendas, is
shared by Justice O'Connor in Kolender v. Lawson:39
[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but.., the require-
ment that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." (citation
omitted). Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute
33 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997).
34 See, e.g., Anderson, Paradox of IT Compliance, supra note 20, at 278-87 (quoting Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 228).
35 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
36 See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Manne's Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of Conservative
Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949 (1985).
37 Greg Ferrell, SAC's Cohen May Face SEC Suit as Deposition Hurts Case, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
19, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://perma.cc/CY9K-KLNW.
38 Kripke, supra note 36, at 949.
39 Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
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may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections.
40
U.S. Circuit Court Judge Barrington Parker expressed this concern during
oral argument in United States v. Newman41 when he challenged the gov-
ernment's "amorphous theory" of insider trading liability as leaving "all
these institutions at the mercy of the government.'42 And there is evidence
to suggest that abuse has occurred in the context of insider trading enforce-
ment.
B. Abuse of Discretion
For instance, some have noted that enforcement officials and prosecu-
tors are wont to "exploit the hostile reaction [insider trading] provokes
among the general public" to "generate positive publicity" for themselves
(or to deflect criticism) in the wake of market downturns.43 For example, in
the wake of the sub-prime mortgage meltdown of 2008, the government
needed "a white collar scandal that it could tout as having successfully
prosecuted to satisfy the public's demand for Wall Street scalps."'  Insider
trading prosecutions offered the anodyne for wounded political reputations:
"[I]nsider trading was viewed as the easiest way to restore the [SEC's] rep-
utation following the Madoff catastrophe and the image hit taken in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. 4  The government's "amorphous theo-
ries" of insider trading liability permitted it to rack up scores of white collar
scalps at a near perfect conviction rate. These efforts put United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, on the cover
of Time Magazine with the headline, "This Man Is Busting Wall St."46 The
fact that insider trading had nothing to do with the financial collapse was
not important. Decades before, similar concerns were raised that then-
United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani sensationalized his insider trading
cases in the 1980s for political purposes, and to support his immanent "bid
for public office.
47
It has also been suggested that insider trading enforcement has been
exploited by the SEC in its turf wars with other agencies over money, juris-
40 Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974)).
41 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014).
42 See Nate Raymond, U.S. Prosecutor Grilled over Insider Trading Definition in Key Appeal,
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2014, 3:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/insidertrading-appeal-
idUSL2NONEOOR20140422 (quoting U.S. Circuit Judge Barrington Parker).
43 Henning, supra note 8, at 762.
44 GASPARINO, supra note 21, at 17.
41 ld. at 20 1.
46 Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012, at 22.
47 JAMES B. STEWARD, DEN OF THIEVES 383 (1992).
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diction, and prestige. Professor Stephen Bainbridge explains that, accord-
ing "to one widely accepted theory of bureaucratic behavior, administrators
can maximize their salaries, power, and reputation by maximizing the size
of their agency's budget."48 And Professor Macey claims that the SEC's
"politicization of the insider trading issue" enabled it to "double its budget
by arguing that more resources were necessary to combat [what it had con-
vinced the public was a] dire national emergency."49
It is clear that money matters to prosecutors and the SEC every bit as
much as it does to the insider traders they prosecute. For instance, in the
1980s, the SEC reached a $100 million settlement with Ivan Boesky, but
they needed him to sell his portfolio to get it. The SEC knew that news of
Boesky's arrest would send the market into a tailspin, so it "directed
Boesky to begin liquidating some of his holdings during the two weeks
preceding the announcement.50 In other words, the SEC directed Boesky
to trade on the material nonpublic information of his own charges and set-
tlement to protect their $100 million fine. The other arbitrageurs (and regu-
lar traders) betting alongside Boesky were livid when news of the SEC's
complicity hit. The irony was not lost on the press either. The Washington
Post ran a front-page story titled, "Wall Street Lambastes SEC Action:
Agency Reportedly Let Beosky Sell Off Stocks in Advance."'" One trader,
David Nolan, noted that "[t]he SEC has unwittingly aided one of the largest
insider trading scams in history."52 Not long after providing this quote to
the Post, Mr. Nolan himself was investigated for insider trading, which
raises another concern.3
As one commentator explains, the "government, being the govern-
ment, can always find something to charge you with, and they will do so if
you rub their noses in it."54 Vague and amorphous prohibitions like insider
trading are ready weapons for government agencies to retaliate against po-
litical enemies or to bully those who refuse to do their bidding. In 2014,
Nelson Obus, whose hedge fund was the target of an insider trading en-
forcement action, authored a Wall Street Journal commentary entitled, "Re-
fusing to Buckle to SEC Intimidation."55 In it, Obus paints the picture of a
48 Bainbridge, State Law Fiduciary Duties, supra note 21, at 1246.
49 MACEY, supra note 5, at 4.
50 STEWARD, supra note 47, at 337.
51 David A. Vise & Michael Schrage, Wall Street Lambastes SEC Action: Agency Reportedly Let
Boesky Sell Off Stocks in Advance, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 21, 1986, at Al.
52 Id.
53 STEWARD, supra note 47, at 345.
54 GASPARINO, supra note 21, at 230. The reference here is to John Kinnucan, an independent
research analyst who refused to wear a wire for the government and was eventually convicted of securi-
ties fraud. Kinnucan is best known for his colorful (and often racist) email rants criticizing the govern-
ment. Gasparino's book offers a detailed account of these events.
55 Nelson Obus, Refusing to Buckle to SEC Intimidation, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2014, 7:37 p.m.)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nelson-obus-refusing-to-buckle-to-sec-intimidation- 1403651178.
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twelve-year SEC enforcement process that was short on substance and long
on political motives. Vagueness in the law and virtually unlimited re-
sources permitted the SEC to press even a weak case for over a decade at a
cost of $12 million in legal fees.56 According to Obus, the SEC attempted
to "bully" him into a settlement, but he refused to admit guilt since he had
done nothing wrong." Obus expresses concern that "not many small firms
could be expected to weather such a storm from a system that provides reg-
ulators with every incentive to overreach without repercussions" and he
worries that most will be forced to "settle or falsely admit wrongdoing."58
C. Current Regime Is Incoherent
In addition to being unjust for the reasons already stated, the current
U.S. insider trading enforcement regime is incoherent. This incoherence is
due to the fact that it is driven by two competing and irreconcilable ration-
ales. The SEC and federal prosecutors continue to press for a parity of in-
formation (or at least equal access) regime through their rulemaking author-
ity and prosecutorial discretion. The judiciary, on the other hand, remains
committed to the fraud-based model reflected in the language of Section
10(b). The unsurprising result of this schizophrenia has been that in prac-
tice neither model is effectively implemented, and everyone is left guessing.
To begin, if the current regime is judged by the SEC's own stated goal
of achieving a "level playing field" by guaranteeing that all market partici-
pants have equal access to information, then it is woefully under-inclusive
in its reach.9 There are a number of forms of willful securities trading
based on material nonpublic information that are not proscribed under the
current fiduciary-duty-based enforcement regime. For example, the current
regime does not proscribe trading based on material nonpublic information
acquired by eavesdropping or luck.65 In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court
held that no Section 10(b) insider trading liability is incurred where a tippee
trades on material nonpublic information that is provided by an insider who




59 See, e.g., Marc I Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation-A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT'L
LAW 153, 158 (2003) ("The goal that ordinary investors play on a level playing field with market pro-
fessionals, having equal access to material nonpublic information, no longer survives under Section
10(b) insider trading jurisprudence.").
60 See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 765-66 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (relying on Dirks v.
SEC to find that Switzer was not liable under Section 10(b) for trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation he overheard at a track meet). See also Anderson, Greed & Envy, supra note 20, at 22-23.
61 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (holding that the test is whether the insider "personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach
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Supreme Court explained that, since the "deception essential to the misap-
propriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of the infor-
mation," there is no Section 10(b) liability for outsiders who brazenly an-
nounce to the source of the material nonpublic information that they intend
to trade on it.6" Finally, the law currently permits insiders to profit by ab-
staining from trading based on material nonpublic information. As Manne
explains, insiders "can make abnormal profits in the stock market simply by
knowing when not to buy and when not to sell,"63 and the SEC only en-
hanced insiders' ability to profit from such strategic abstention by recogniz-
ing Rule 10b5-1 trading plans in 2000.' The selective termination of Rule
10b5-1 trading plans effectively grants insiders a cost-free option to buy or
sell based on material nonpublic information.65
If, however, the current enforcement regime is instead judged by the
fraud cum fiduciary standard articulated by the courts, it is over-inclusive in
two important respects. First, common law fraud requires some knowing
deception, or scienter.66 The Supreme Court has consistently held that Sec-
tion 10(b) liability requires "knowing or intentional misconduct."67 How-
ever, in promulgating Rule 10b5-l(b) in 2000, the SEC seems to have ef-
fectively dropped the requirement of scienter for insider trading liability.
The prelude to Rule 10b5-1 explains that the rule "defines when a purchase
or sale constitutes trading 'on the basis of material nonpublic information
in insider trading cases brought" under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 1Ob-5.6"
Rule 10b5-1(b) then goes on to define the mental-state requirement that
trading be "on the basis of' material nonpublic information as demanding
nothing more than "awareness" (or mere possession) of material nonpublic
information while trading. The result is that an insider who sells shares for
no other reason than to pay for her husband's emergency heart transplant is
nevertheless liable for insider trading if she happened to be in possession of
material nonpublic information at the time of the trade. As Professor Allan
of duty to stockholders [by the tipper]. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach
[by the tippee]"). See also SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (no liability
where insider tipped his barber because there was not benefit to the insider).
62 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). Indeed, Justice Thomas pointed out that
under the current regime, "were the source expressly to authorize its agents to trade on the confidential
information-as a perk or bonus perhaps-there would likewise be no § 10(b) violation." Id. at 689
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933, 938
(1985).
64 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
65 See, Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 20, at 365.
66 See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525-6 (1977).
67 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). See also Carol B. Swanson, Insider
Trading Madness: Rule 1Ob5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 155 (2003) (noting
the Supreme Court "has repeatedly asserted that [Rule lOb-5] liability involves deceptive acts").
68 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
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Horwich puts it, "the SEC may have indulged in some linguistic legerde-
main ... arguably transforming a phrase that connotes a deliberate act...
into something less.69 Indeed, one commentator goes so far as to suggest
that Rule 10b5-1 converts insider trading into a strict liability offense,7"
which is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's announcement hat
though Section 10(b) was designed as a catch-all, "what it catches must be
fraud."'"
A second important way in which the current enforcement regime is
over-inclusive under the fraud-based model is its proscription of issuer-
licensed insider trading. I shall define what I mean by "issuer-licensed in-
sider trading" in Section III below and explain why its proscription is in-
consistent with a fraud-based theory of insider trading liability in Section
IV below. For now I simply offer the promissory note that such trading is
not deceptive and cannot therefore be coherently articulated as a form of
Section 10(b) fraud.
D. Current Regime Is Irrational
The incoherence of the current regime combined with the vague and
undefined elements of the offense leaves market participants guessing, and
markets abhor uncertainty. The result is that the above-described dysfunc-
tion in the current regime often undermines many of the concrete market-
related values the regulation of insider trading purports to promote. The
current regime is therefore irrational.
The problem of insider trading compliance for issuers offers just one
example. Faced with ambiguity in the law, issuers are unable to design
effective compliance programs that identify and preempt only illicit trades.
The only way for firms to protect against civil and criminal liability has
been to adopt overbroad compliance programs. For example, issuers often
impose overly restrictive pre-clearance standards for employee trading and
excessively long blackout periods during which employees are precluded
from trading altogether. However, I have argued elsewhere that these
"play-it-safe" compliance policies come at a heavy price to firms in terms
of corporate culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, and cost of capi-
tal.
72
First, ambiguity in the law forces compliance officers conducting pre-
clearance interviews to view with skepticism employee claims that they are
not trading the firm's shares based on material nonpublic information.
69 Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule JOb5-1, 62
Bus. LAW 913, 921 (2007).
70 See Swanson, supra note 67, at 151-52.
71 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
72 See generally, Anderson, Paradox of IT Compliance, supra note 20.
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Such scrutiny of motives can lead to resentment on the part of employees.
This resentment may in turn undermine the spirit of cooperation and mutual
respect that is so important to a strong compliance culture, and to the firm's
profitability.73 Issuers could try to avoid this internal tension by turning the
pre-clearance process over to outside counsel, but such outsourcing is ex-
pensive, and these costs are ultimately born by the shareholder.4
Second, it is common for corporate insiders to receive a large portion
of their compensation in firm shares.5 But the liquidity of these shares
affects their value. Any restrictions the firm places on its employees' abil-
ity to monetize these shares will devalue them as compensation, forcing the
company to issue more shares to employees to achieve the same remunera-
tive effect.76 This increased cost of compensation is, again, passed along to
the firm's shareholders in lost share value.77
Third, employees often account for a large proportion of an issuer's
outstanding shares.78 So it stands to reason that significant restrictions on
employee trading will decrease liquidity in the firm's shares. This decrease
in liquidity will, in turn, increase the cost of capital to the firm.79 Once
more, these additional costs are ultimately born by shareholders in the form
of lost share value.
I have referred to these problems together as composing the paradox of
insider trading compliance for issuers."° Vagueness in the law of insider
trading combined with the threat of harsh sanctions creates a perverse in-
centive to adopt inefficient compliance programs that can poison a corpo-
rate culture, decrease liquidity, increase cost of capital, and ultimately un-
dermine shareholder value. The current regime is irrational to the extent
that it undermines these important values which it purports to protect and
promote.
All of this is to say that the current insider trading enforcement regime
would be unjust, incoherent, irrational, and in desperate need of reform
even if all the insider trading that is currently regulated were socially harm-
ful and morally impermissible. In other words, even if the "it's just not
73 See id. at 291.
74 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Callfor Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1180-82 (2003).
75 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 7, at 508 (Between 1999-2008, "the average public company
executive earned more than half her total pay in the form of stock options or restricted stock.").
76 Id. at 509-10.
77 See Heminway, supra note 74, at 1174-77.
78 See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 804 (2014)
(citing a study suggesting that directors and officers own an average of twenty-four to thirty-two percent
of a given firm's equity).
79 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN.
ECON. 223, 249 (1986) (noting that the greater a security's liquidity, the lower the expected return
demanded by investors, which decreases the firm's cost of capital).
80 See Anderson, Paradox of Compliance, supra note 20, at 295.
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right" objector to insider trading turned out to be correct, our shared com-
mitment to justice, internal coherence, and rationality in the law would still
suggest that the current insider trading enforcement regime be reformed. It
turns out, however, that one of the forms of insider trading that is currently
regulated, what I refer to as issuer-licensed insider trading, is harmless and
morally permissible. In the next two sections I shall argue that liberalizing
the current regime to legalize issuer-licensed insider trading would solve
many of its current problems, but that accepting this reform will turn cru-
cially on ethical justifications.
III. PROPOSED REFORM: EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZE ISSUER-LICENSED
INSIDER TRADING
There is no single solution to the dysfunction that pervades the U.S.
insider trading enforcement regime. I am, however, convinced that one
reform would dramatically improve clarity, coherence, and rationality in the
law, and it could be accomplished entirely through SEC rulemaking, with-
out the need to amend Section 10(b). The proposed reform is the express
authorization through SEC rulemaking of issuer-licensed insider trading.
This modification to the current regime would permit issuers, at their dis-
cretion, to allow their employees to trade the firm's shares based on materi-
al nonpublic information so long as the following conditions are satisfied: "!
(1) the insider submits a written plan to the firm that details the
proposed trade(s);
(2) the firm authorizes that plan;
(3) the firm has previously disclosed to the investing public that it
will permit its employees to trade on the firm's material non-
public information through these plans when it is in the interest
of the firm; and
(4) the firm discloses ex post all trading profits resulting from the
execution of these plans.
It is important to note that this proposed reform would not affect the current
regulation of issuer-proscribed insider trading (i.e., classical insider trading
81 1 first proposed the following reform in Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 20, at 380-81.
See also Anderson, Paradox of Compliance, supra note 20, at 308.
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where the insider trades based on material nonpublic information despite
the fact that the issuer has prohibited such trading), nor would it affect the
current regulation of trading under the misappropriation theory as defined
above. As I explain below, both issuer-proscribed insider trading and mis-
appropriation trading are economically harmful, morally wrong, and should
continue to be proscribed.82
So how would authorizing issuer-licensed insider trading improve
matters? The reform does not offer a statutory definition of insider trading,
nor does it solve the problem of vagueness in insider trading's common-law
elements. It does, however, bring relative certainty to a large, perhaps the
largest, class of potential insider traders, namely issuers and the corporate
insiders whom they employ. Issuers who are concerned about the risk of
civil and criminal exposure for their trading and the trading of their em-
ployees could take refuge in the safe harbor offered by the reform. With
the proper disclosures in place, they could be certain that any authorized
trades in the firm's shares would not run afoul of the Section 10(b) insider
trading regime. Corporate insiders themselves would enjoy the same cer-
tainty with any authorized trade, regardless of whether they possess materi-
al nonpublic information. In addition, this increased certainty for issuers
and insiders would decrease the risk of abuse of regulatory and prosecutori-
al discretion.
This reform would also resolve the paradox of insider trading compli-
ance for issuers.83 By availing themselves of the safe harbor, firms would
no longer feel compelled to preclude otherwise harmless trades for fear they
might incur civil or criminal penalties. The firm's business judgment, not
fear of regulatory scrutiny, would determine trading decisions and the li-
quidity of employee shares. If a firm rejects an insider's trading request
and the employee trades anyway, then any regulatory action for insider
trading would now be consistent with the firm's interests. In short, the pro-
posed reform would virtually eliminate the heavy costs of insider trading
compliance for issuers under the current regime, and it would bring the
interests of issuers and regulators into complete alignment.
But there is a problem. The main objection to any reform package that
includes an express safe harbor for issuer-licensed insider trading will be
that such trading "is just not right!" Unless this challenge is confronted
82 A strong argument can be made that, based on dicta from Chiarella and O'Hagan, issuer-
licensed insider trading is already permitted under Section 10(b). See Anderson, Anticipating a Sea
Change, supra note 20, at 385-86. See also, Henderson, supra note 7; Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dys-
functional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1491, 1515-20 (1999). Given, however, that the
SEC would almost certainly challenge any such interpretation-and at least some lower courts would
back them-no firm would (or should) take the risk of testing the theory absent clear guidance from the
SEC.
83 This paragraph summarizes points made in Anderson, Paradox of IT Compliance, supra note
20, at 308-10.
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directly, and in the ethical terms in which it is posed, the proposed reform
cannot hope to succeed.
IV. WHY ISSUER-LICENSED INSIDER TRADING IS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE
For the reasons stated in Section II, the current insider trading regime
would be unjust even if the conduct it sought to proscribe was itself morally
impermissible. But, at least with respect to issuer-licensed insider trading,
the proscribed conduct is morally permissible from the standpoint of the
two principal moral theories informing Western liberal jurisprudence-
consequentialism and deontology. It remains to sketch out some arguments
to this conclusion, though there is no space here to develop them in detail.
To inquire into the moral permissibility of insider trading with any
precision, it is first necessary to posit a legal regime that does not proscribe
it. This allows us to separate our analysis of the morality of insider trading
from the more general questions of when (if ever) it is morally permissible
to violate the law, or when (if ever) it is permissible to violate the pre-
arranged rules of a cooperative scheme.84 The analysis below therefore
assumes a regime that does not regulate any form of insider trading and
then answers the question of whether, in such a regime, there would be eth-
ical reasons for imposing such regulation.
Consequentialism identifies the rightness or wrongness of acts or rules
with the goodness or badness of their consequences. There are two crucial
elements to any consequentialist moral theory. First, the theory must define
what is good. Defining the good provides the consequentialist with the
criterion "for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst from an
impersonal standpoint."85 Second, once the good is defined, consequential-
ism simply holds that the morally right action will be that which brings
about the state of affairs that maximizes that good.86
Utilitarianism, which defines the good in terms of happiness or prefer-
ence satisfaction, is by far the most prominent consequentialist theory.
When utilitarianism is applied to the context of law, it tests the utility of
legal rules and principles (rather than specific acts)." The principle of rule
utilitarianism may be articulated as follows: "[T]he rightness or wrongness
of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the conse-
84 Professor Stuart Green, for example, has suggested that insider trading is morally wrong be-
cause it cheats the established market rules. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A
MORAL THEORY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 235-40 (2006). Such arguments are just not helpful when
the question is whether there are moral reasons for regulating insider trading the first place.
85 Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
86 Id.
87 J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR & AGAINST 9 (2008).
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quences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circum-
stances."88
Though there are certainly affinities between the economic analysis of
law and rule utilitarianism (both are concerned with maximization strate-
gies),89 the former is not grounded in the latter, and the two approaches to
law can sometimes conflict.9" Nevertheless, economic analysis can be an
effective tool for testing the social utility of certain conduct. And, indeed, it
is fair to say that the economic analysis of insider trading offered by Manne
and others takes us much of the way toward explaining when insider trading
is and is not morally permissible on utilitarian grounds.
The economic consequences of insider trading have been hotly debat-
ed.9 The most commonly cited economic benefits of insider trading in-
clude increased stock price accuracy,92 real-time information to the mar-
kets93 and to management,94 its market-smoothing effect,95 and its use as an
88 Id.
89 Some see the link between utilitarianism and the economic analysis of law. See, e.g., Kim Lane
Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 150
(1993) (suggesting that utilitarianism is "the moral theory that underwrites the law and economics
perspective").
90 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10, at 403 ("the economic approach is neither deducible from nor
completely consistent with [utilitarianism]"). Deviations will occur when rules promoting market effi-
ciency fail to maximize overall social welfare-though rational choice theorists would argue this will
rarely occur. For example, conflicts will arise where economic and moral conceptions of happiness
differ (e.g., preference versus hedonistic, relative versus non-relative) and maximization differ (e.g.,
pareto efficiency versus the principle of utility). Moreover, recall that utilitarianism is just one form of
consequentialism. If the good is defined as something other than happiness (think, e.g., perfectionist
theories of the good), then it is easy to see how these approaches to law may come into conflict. See,
e.g., T. HURKA, PERFECTIONISM, 55-60 (1993).
91 For a more thorough summary of this debate, see Anderson, Greed & Envy, supra note 20, at 7-
17.
92 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 6, at 868 ("If insiders trade, the share price will move
closer to what it would have been had the information been disclosed.").
93 Insider trading allows a company's insider's assessments of endogenous information to be
reflected in its market price on a daily basis without the costs and delays associated with public filings
and releases. See id. ("Through insider trading, a firm can convey information it could not feasibly
announce publicly because an announcement would destroy the value of the information, would be too
expensive, not believable, or-owing to the uncertainty of the information-would subject the firm to
massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be incorrect.").
94 Real-time reflection of a company's information through its stock price can also inform upper
management. For example, Manne pointed out that insiders often trade on nonpublic information con-
ceming their company problems (fraud or other issues) that have not yet been brought to the attention of
management. Any corresponding change in the stock price may raise a "red flag" to management and
allow them to address the problem before it worsens. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek,
Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174-83 (2005).
95 As Professor Stephen Bainbridge explains, "[a]ccurate pricing benefits society by improving
the economy's allocation of capital investment and by decreasing the volatility of security prices. This
dampening of price fluctuations decreases the likelihood of individual windfall gains and increases the
attractiveness of investing in securities for risk-averse investors. The individual corporation also bene-
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efficient means of compensation.9 6  The most commonly-cited economic
harms associated with insider trading are that it increases the bid-ask spread
set by market makers97 and that it undermines investor confidence in the
markets,9" both of which increase the cost of capital to firms.99 There is also
the concern that insider trading creates perverse incentives by giving em-
ployees an opportunity to profit from their company's bad news.'00
Starting with issuer-proscribed and misappropriation insider trading,
the utility calculus is relatively straightforward. It is fair to assume that
neither an issuer (in the case of issuer-proscribed insider trading) nor the
source of the information (in the case of misappropriation trading) would
demand a commitment from the would-be trader not to trade unless they
expected an all-things-considered net harm would result from such trading.
If insiders or misappropriators were permitted to trade despite their com-
mitment not to do so, then issuers and sources would be forced to incur
these costs. Add to this the broader disutility of undermining the socially
beneficial practice of promise-making in the corporate context,'1 as well as
the general market costs associated with a higher bid-ask spread, moral
fits from accurate pricing of its securities through reduced investor uncertainty and improved monitoring
of management's effectiveness." Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading: An Overview, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 777-78 (Boudewijn Boukaert and Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000). See also,
MANNE, supra note 1, at 80-90.
96 Insider trading can serve as an attractive form of compensation for company employees that
encourages innovation and entrepreneurship at relatively little cost to the shareholders. See, e.g., Henry
G. Manne, Entrepreneurship, Compensation, and the Corporation, 14 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 17-18
(2011). As Manne explains, if a "service performed is or can be one which gives access to valuable
information [that can be monetized], less of other forms of compensation must be paid in order to secure
the same amount of the service." Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 547, 579 (1970).
97 Where insider trading is unchecked by regulation, there is the concem that market makers will
be forced to increase the spread between their bid and ask prices to protect against adverse selection by
insiders. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 1, 14 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969). As one
commentator explains, "The essence of the adverse selection model is that because of order imbalances
and the difficulty of sustaining a liquid market only with matching, a liquidity provider has to transact
with his own inventory and thus bears the risk of consistently buying 'high' from and selling 'low' to
insiders." Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of
Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 98 (2004).
98 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("Although informational dispar-
ity is inevitable in securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.").
99 See, e.g., Dolgopolov, supra note 97, 100-01 ("a greater bid-ask spread is likely to have an
adverse effect on the security's liquidity, the firm's cost of capital, and its stock price").
100 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68
VA. L. REV. 117, 149(1982).
101 See Anderson, Greed & Envy, supra note 20, at 29.
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hazard, and dampened market confidence, and the calculus suggests that
these forms of insider trading are morally wrong on utilitarian grounds.
1 2
But the landscape changes dramatically once the focus shifts to issuer-
licensed insider trading. Here, the issuer's own all-things-considered calcu-
lus has determined that such trading will result in a net benefit to the firm.
By retaining the power to approve or reject proposed plans, the issuer itself
controls the risks. For example, it must be presumed that when an issuer
licenses a trade its calculus has already factored in any potential increases
in cost of capital and decreased share liquidity that might result from an
increased bid-ask spread. Retaining the discretion to approve or reject
trades in advance also eliminates the risk of perverse employee incentives.
Additionally, insofar as issuer-licensed insider trading actually benefits
firms (for, again, if it did not, then it would not be licensed), the practice
should reinforce rather than undermine market confidence.3 Finally, any
utility calculus must factor the saved costs of enforcement and compliance
where such trading is not regulated." In sum, when these considerations
are taken together, there can be little doubt that issuer-licensed insider trad--
ing is morally permissible on utilitarian grounds.
Ultimately, however, the principal moral objection to issuer-licensed
insider trading in our own public political discourse-and therefore the
principal obstacle to reform in the U.S.-is not utilitarian. If it were, then
the preceding economic considerations would probably be enough to win
the public's hearts and minds over for liberalization. Rather, the principal
objection to issuer-licensed insider trading is "consequences be damned, it's
just not right!" Such objections are driven by deontological moral intui-
tions sometimes expressed in the mantra, "let justice be done though the
heavens fall!"' 5
Deontology is a duty-based moral theory.'6 It does not judge the mor-
al quality of an act by its consequences, but by its motive, and whether that
motive complies with the absolute commands of moral law. 7 Perhaps the
most recognized articulation of a deontological moral theory is found in the
"end-in-oneself' formulation of Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative:
"Act so that you treat humanity... always as an end and never as a means
102 See id at 29-30.
103 See id at 41-42.
104 For example, the current regime's U.S. regulation of issuer-licensed insider trading has given
rise to the paradox of compliance outlined above in Section Ill; a regime that permits such trading
would resolve this paradox and align the interests of issuers and regulators.
105 See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
106 The word "deontology" finds its root in the Greek word "deon," meaning duty. PETER A.
ANGELES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 60 (1981).
107 For a more complete summary of deontological moral theory and its application in this context,
see Anderson, Greed & Envy, supra note 20, at 33-43. Much of what follows summarizes arguments
first made in Greed & Envy.
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only."' °8 In other words, one should never use another person for purposes
that person would reject. Kant's categorical imperative gives expression to
our shared commitment to the idea that, as free and equal rational agents,
we all enjoy an absolute moral worth that cannot be traded or purchased in
the name of private expedience or social welfare. It also offers an explicit
theoretical articulation of our common sense notions of justice and fairness.
To the extent Manne's student's (and the general public's) objection that
insider trading is "just not right" is motivated by such deontological com-
mitments, they draw on deeply rooted and widely shared values. Such ob-
jections cannot be answered by talk of pareto efficiencies, and they will not
simply go away if dismissed or ignored. They must be explicitly confront-
ed on their own terms if they are to be overcome.
Once again, it is helpful to separate the analysis of issuer-proscribed
and misappropriation trading from issuer-licensed insider trading. One
need not look beyond the promise the insider makes not to trade on the
firm's material nonpublic information to conclude that issuer-proscribed
insider trading violates Kant's categorical imperative. Such trading neces-
sarily treats the promisee (the firm and its shareholders) solely as the means
to an end (the use of the company's material nonpublic information for
trading profits) that the promisee has expressly rejected. If an issuer public-
ly affirms that it does not allow its insiders to trade on material nonpublic
information, then issuer-proscribed insider trading also treats other traders
in that firm's shares as mere means because they have presumably priced its
shares based on the expectation that such trading is not permitted. Misap-
propriation trading is morally impermissible for the same reasons. The
misappropriator gains the material nonpublic information on which she
trades by making the promise not to trade. In breaking that promise and
trading, the misappropriator uses the source of the information as the means
to an end the source has expressly rejected.
Things look very different when we turn to issuer-licensed insider
trading. Such trading does not deceive or violate a promise to the firm be-
cause the firm has licensed the trade. And there is no deception of others
who trade in the firm's shares because the issuer has disclosed that it allows
its employees to trade based on material nonpublic information and the
profits earned by such trading. Such disclosures give counterparties ade-
quate notice and opportunity to price the issuer's shares accordingly. In
sum, all interested parties to the issuer-licensed insider's trading (both the
issuer, the counterparty, and the broader market) are fully informed in ad-
vance of the trade and are therefore respected as ends in themselves and not
treated as mere means.
108 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (Lewis White Beck
trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1785).
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These deontological considerations (in addition to others there is no
space to develop here"0 9) deprive the opponent of legalizing issuer-licensed
insider trading of any reason-based justification in terms of fraudulent de-
ception, justice or fairness. And they offer another reason for reform-
namely that a whole class of insider trading that incurs criminal liability
under our current regime would morally innocent if unregulated. But the
moral duties of justice and fairness do not exhaust the ethical landscape. In
fact, many journalists, politicians, and judges object to insider trading as a
manifestation of the vice of greed. As Professors Charles Cox and Kevin
Fogarty put it, "[t]he wave of major insider trading prosecutions has been
taken by many as a symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street.""0 Profes-
sor Bainbridge quotes a California state court's claim that insider trading is
"a manifestation of undue greed among the already well-to-do, worthy of
legislative intervention if for no other reason than to send a message of cen-
sure on behalf of the American people."'' And Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Michael Garcia announced that "[g]reed is at work" when the feds unveiled
the Galleon Group insider trading case in 2007, celebrating it as "the big-
gest insider trading bust" since the 1980s.12 But is policing greed a legiti-
mate end of our criminal justice system? And if it were, would the crimi-
nalization of issuer-licensed insider trading be an effective means?
V. GREED Is NOT GOOD, BUT IT SHOULDN'T BE ILLEGAL
"Greed is all right, by the way. I want you to know that. I think greed
is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.""' 3 Ivan
Boesky spoke these words in a 1986 commencement address for U.C.
Berkeley's Haas School of Business."' He would surrender to federal au-
thorities on charges of insider trading and other securities violations just a
few short months later."5  The fictional Gordon Gekko paraphrased
Boesky's remarks when he proclaimed that "Greed... is good" in Oliver
109 For a more complete exposition of these arguments, see Anderson, Greed & Envy, supra note
20, at 33-43.
110 Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 353
(1988).
111 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 23 (2013) (quoting
Friese v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal.Rptr. 3d 558, 566 (Cal. App. 2005)).
112 GASPARINO, supra note 21, at 104.
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Stone's sensational expos6 on insider trading, Wall Street.'6 Boesky and
Gekko are, of course, wrong. Greed is, by definition, not good."
7
Aristotle explained why greed is a vice-it is the contrary of the virtue
of generosity. Generosity is the "mean concerned with the giving and tak-
ing of wealth."" 8  The generous person is one who will "both give and
spend the right amount for the right purposes ... and do this with pleas-
ure." ' 9 He does not honor wealth for its own sake, but nevertheless ac-
quires it "for the sake of giving."'2° By contrast, the greedy are "shameful
love[rs] of gain" who "go to excess in taking, by taking anything from any
source."'' In their pursuit of wealth for its own sake, they are prepared to
go to "great efforts and put up with reproaches."'22
There is no question that the facts of many insider trading cases reflect
the grasping smallness of character Aristotle describes. But while acts of
greed are always harmful to the actor's character, they need not be harmful
to others. In fact, greedy acts will typically only directly harm others where
they are also unjust or unfair. We have, however, already considered and
rejected the argument that issuer-licensed insider trading is unjust or unfair.
So, if issuer-licensed insider trading is regarded as unethical because it re-
flects the character flaw of greed-it is a completely self-regarding wrong.
In other words, it harms no one but the person who engages in it.
There are at least three points to be made here. First, though issuer-
licensed insider trading may sometimes be motivated by greed, it needn't
always be so motivated. For example, the generous issuer-licensed insider
trader may seek gain to help a family member get through college, to pay
for a friend's expensive medical treatment, or to engage in some other form
of philanthropy.' Thus, any legal prohibition of issuer-licensed insider
trading based on greed would be over-inclusive. Moreover, since there are
many other opportunities for obscene profit-making in our free-market sys-
116 WALL STREET (2 0 1h Century Fox 1987).
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phase of his trial. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Push for Leniency as an Ex-Goldman Director Faces Sen-
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tem (including other ways to profit by trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation),124 it would also be woefully under-inclusive.
Second, even if a good argument could be made that allowing issuer-
licensed insider trading will tempt citizens to the vice of greed, this is insuf-
ficient justification for its criminalization. This justification is paternalistic
and moralistic in nature. It would place issuer-licensed insider trading into
the same class as now-disfavored moralistic laws against sodomy, adultery,
and same-sex marriage. Such laws violate the longstanding tenet of Anglo-
American justice and jurisprudence expressed in John Stuart Mill's harm
principle: "[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant."1
25
Finally, if we are going to get into the business of criminalizing vi-
cious character traits, perhaps we should scrutinize the motives of the
would-be regulators of insider trading. Some have suggested that the crim-
inalization of even issuer-licensed insider trading is best explained as the
political exploitation of the vice of envy shared by many in the electorate
over the vast disparity in wealth between the hard-working denizens of
Main Street and the "fat cats" of Wall Street. As Bainbridge puts it, absent
evidence of investor injury, any anger the public feels "over insider trading
... has nothing to do with a loss of confidence in the integrity of the mar-
ket, but instead arises principally from envy of the insider's greater access
to information. '126 So understood, the prohibition of insider trading "is not
so much an antifraud rule as a law against easy money."'27 Professor Don-
ald Langevoort adds that, on this view, which "smacks a bit of populism, of
envy and resentment directed at the privileges of class and wealth," insiders
"should be content with their paychecks and not overreach for profits.' 28
Envy is generally regarded as one of the worst vices. This is because
the perverse goal of envy is the destruction of what is good solely to see
another deprived of it.'29 Aristotle describes envy as the perfect vice be-
cause it cannot admit of moderation. According to Aristotle, envy's name
alone (like "murder") implies badness.3° And Kant describes it simply as
124 See Section 1I above (noting that, e.g., trading based on material nonpublic information ac-
quired by eavesdropping or luck is not proscribed by the current Section 10(b) insider trading enforce-
ment regime).
125 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (2d ed. 1859) (emphasis added).
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CARDozo L. REV. 2023 (2005).
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the "hatred of human beings.'' In addition, the philosopher John Rawls
points out that the prevalence of envy in a society can have devastating
effects on social stability. Not only are the envious prepared to do things
that make both themselves and the objects of their envy worse off "if only
the discrepancy between them is sufficiently reduced," but when the objects
of envy realize they have been targeted, "they may become jealous of their
better circumstances and anxious to take precautions against the hostile acts
to which [others'] envy makes [them] prone."'3 Thus, at a minimum, we
need to be careful that any criminalization of issuer-licensed insider trading
is not motivated by the vice of envy, and is not therefore giving expression
to the worst in ourselves and our society.
CONCLUSION
Nothing in this Article is intended as an indictment of the economic
analysis of law or its implications for the regulation of insider trading. The
work of Manne and others on the economics of insider trading has been.
absolutely crucial to our understanding of the stakes in play-both financial
and moral. I concede that Manne's work constituted the important first step
toward insider trading reform. My aim here has been to point out that the
economic critique of the U.S. insider trading enforcement regime has gone
about as far as it can go. Those who hold the keys to reform continue to
answer the economic critique with "it's just not right!" arguments. The
result has been an absence of constructive discourse. Parties to the contro-
versy use different vocabularies and therefore continue to speak at cross-
purposes. In the meantime, a hopelessly unjust and dysfunctional regime is
perpetuated by default. If any change is to occur, the proponents of the-
current regime must be confronted directly, and with their own ethical vo-
cabulary. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the average American (and
therefore the politicians and judges who represent them) is the final step to
insider trading reform, and this step can only be made by taking ethical
arguments seriously. I have sketched out some of these arguments here, but
there is much more to be done.
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